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Education and Change: A Historical Perspective on Schooling, 
Development and the Nepali Nation-State1 
 
Martha Caddell 
 
By making a unified Nepal, the farsighted King Prithvi Narayan Shah 
made the nation very strong and laid the foundations for a strong sense of 
national pride.  No one can take this away.  We are all – people from the 
mountains, plains and hills – able to say we are Nepali (Mero Desh, Book 
5, Lesson 10, translated from the Nepali). 
 
 
Introduction 
In contemporary Nepal schools are being utilised by a variety of groups as key sites 
for both promoting and challenging visions of national identity and the Nepali state.  
School assemblies, textbooks and examinations promote a view of national identity 
and development based on a selective incorporation of social diversity, with 
Hinduism, the monarchy and engagement in processes of modernisation key elements 
of the picture promoted.  Social studies textbooks, as the introductory extract 
highlights, attempt to create a sense of unity among students with reference to the 
deeds of ‘national heroes’ and a shared history.  Similarly, emphasis is placed on 
participation in national development efforts and the need to promote change at both 
an individual and countrywide level.  Such discussions also serve to link these efforts 
to global reform agendas and the work of international development agencies with, 
for example, lessons focused on the work of the United Nations and the need for 
population control in the interests of alleviating poverty and protecting the 
environment.2  
 
Since the return to multi-party democracy in 1990, aspects of this vision have been 
increasingly contested. For example, language issues have emerged as a key area of 
contention and ethnic activist groups have utilised campaigns for the provision of 
mother-tongue schooling as a focal point for wider social and political demands.  
Further, schools themselves, as symbols of a highly particular construction of the 
state, have become the subject of direct action, including forced closures and physical 
attacks on personnel and property. In December 2002, the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal 
Independent Student Union (ANISU) called an indefinite education strike, forcing the 
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closure of schools and colleges nationwide as a show of strength and to promote their 
demands for wide-reaching social and political change.  Within the social space of the 
school visions of the Nepali nation and appropriate trajectories of development are 
contested and alternatives advanced.  
 
This paper seeks to illuminate the current political significance of schooling by setting 
educational reform within the broader context of socio-political change.  It provides 
an historical overview of the development of education policy in Nepal since the 
overthrow of the Rana oligarchy in 1950.  Each shift in political regime has been 
followed by a revision of the education system as the incoming regime attempted to 
reinforce its own vision of the idea of the Nepali nation-state by re-articulating the 
relationship between the state, schools and ‘the people’. Such continual redefining has 
led to a feeling of “repeated beginnings” (Onta 1996: 221) as newly-formed 
governments sought to legitimate their position by differentiating themselves from the 
previous regime.  Discourses of development and visions of the ‘external’ have 
become intertwined with representations of intra-state relations and schooling itself 
has emerged as a central feature of this vision. By exploring education policy from 
such an historical perspective, this paper highlights the shifting political interests that 
have been asserted in the social space of the school and offers a contextualised 
understanding of contemporary education reforms and broader socio-political 
tensions. 
 
‘Selective Exclusion’: Education Under the Ranas (1846-1950) 
The Rana era extended from the overthrow of the Shah kings in the Kot Massacre of 
18463 through to the restoration of the monarchy and the introduction of political 
parties in 1950.  During this period the ruling elite sought to maintain their almost 
absolute power internally while struggling to accommodate the demands made by the 
East India Company, the government of British India and later the Republic of India 
(Burghart 1996: 227).  The King was reduced to being a “religious and ceremonial 
figurehead”, with the Rana family taking not only the hereditary Prime Ministership 
but also dominating the army and civil government positions. The regime adopted 
isolationist positions both in terms of the contact between the state and the 
international community and in regard to intra-state relations.  Specifically, little 
attempt was made to integrate or unite the various communities within Nepal into a 
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cohesive national unit.  Rather, the Ranas attempted to maintain their power and 
legitimacy through force, instilling fear among the geographically scattered 
population.  Thus, despite being a unitary state within almost the same territorial 
boundaries since 1769, Nepal never became fully “unified in spirit” under the Ranas 
(Mihaly 1965: 14). 
 
The Rana-governed state limited its contacts with external powers as a consequence 
of geographical factors and, most significantly, political restrictions imposed by the 
Treaty of Sagauli, signed with the East India Company in 1815 (Burghart 1996: 227). 
As a result of this, all contact with a third party had to be negotiated with the British 
and a permanent British Resident was placed in Kathmandu. Thus, the Ranas’ policy 
was not so much one of total isolationism but rather the “selective exclusion” of 
particular aspects of “foreignness” (Liechty 1997).4  The contact with the British in 
India exposed the Ranas to Western ideas and institutions, some of which came to 
influence how the Ranas governed the state and sought to enhance their own position 
within it and in the region.  
 
The diversity within the Nepali state was recognised through a framework of 
inequality, with cultural variation framed around the central pillar of Hinduism and 
rulers presented as a focal point of the political and ritual order (Pfaff-Czarnecka 1999: 
52, Burghart 1996).  Ethnic and caste-based divisions were legally formalised in the 
Muluki Ain (National Legal Code) of 1854, in order to create a national hierarchy 
which effectively legitimated the position of the ruling group (Hofer 1979). Prestige 
and social advancement thus came to be associated with the practices and customs of 
high caste Hindu groups, with opportunities to gain education and employment in the 
civil service dependent on familial and caste ties with the Rana elite.5  Such a vision 
gained further legitimacy as members of various ethnic groups sought to enhance their 
positions through adopting the cultural symbols and traits of those in power (Pfaff-
Czarnecka 1999: 53), a move which both secured greater opportunities for the ethnic 
elite and further divided any potential sources of opposition to the Rana regime (e.g. 
Jones 1976). Internal legitimacy was thus gained through recourse to a vision of a 
Hindu-based hierarchical model and the image, if not the practice, of monarchical 
supremacy.  External legitimacy and the ability to enter into negotiations on the world 
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stage was made possible by framing decisions within models intelligible to Western, 
and specifically British, audiences. 
 
Education Under the Ranas 
This somewhat contradictory attitude to the world outside the state boundaries, which 
sought to “both limit the dangers inherent in foreignness, and at the same time harness 
its powers” (Liechty 1997: 9), is particularly evident in relation to the provision of 
education under Rana rule.  On the one hand there was a strong recognition of the 
need for the ruling class to engage with Western-style education in order to increase 
their ability to participate effectively in negotiations with other states.  Yet, there was 
also concern about “giving education to the common people, lest they should be 
awakened and be conscious of their rights” (Shakya 1977: 19).  Education was treated 
with considerable suspicion, as was evident to the English journalist Perceval Landon 
during his period in Nepal in the early 1900s. He noted “the first beginnings of 
education were looked upon with something of the mistrust with which the medieval 
church of Rome heard of the work of scientists within her fold” (Landon 1976 [1926]: 
179).  As a result, schooling opportunities were severely restricted, even for the elite, 
and popular education was almost non-existent.6 Formal tutor-led instruction for the 
children of the Rana elite was initiated in 1854 by Jung Bahadur Rana, with classes 
held within his palace.  His successors gradually extended this provision to 
encompass non-Rana children of high status, aided by the relocation of the expanded 
‘Durbar School’ to its current site in central Kathmandu (Aryal 1977, Bista 
1991:119).  
 
The content of the education provided under at the Durbar School was strongly 
influenced by external models of schooling and, in particular, the English system of 
education.7 Such emphasis further reinforced the disparity in status between the ruling 
elite and the rest of the populace.  As Bista notes: 
 
While Nepali language and Sanskrit were taught, little else of Nepal was 
introduced.  The history or geography that was taught was confined to that 
of the British Isles and India, a practice that was to instil a sense of 
inferiority and ineffectiveness of things Nepali and a debasement of the 
ethnic heritage of the different Nepali peoples (1991: 119). 
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Interest in Western-style education for the ruling elite was motivated in part by a need 
to engage with the British in India effectively (Aryal 1977: 123). The ability to 
negotiate with this powerful political force was crucial for the continuation of the 
Rana regime, in terms of maintaining at least nominal sovereignty over the territory of  
the Nepali state and in preventing too much influence of external ideas.  School 
education became a prerequisite for taking up a position in government and literacy 
came to symbolise political influence and social prestige (Caplan 1970, Bista 1991).   
 
However, the perceived educational needs of the elite were tempered by perceptions 
of the risks associated with the provision of certain forms of schooling and, 
particularly, with travel to foreign countries.  In 1902 sons of members of the 
aristocracy were sent to Japan to receive a grounding in technical education to temper 
“the progress of liberal and popular education” (Aryal 1977:124).  However, concern 
was raised about the dangers associated with the contact they had with impure, non-
Hindu peoples (Landon 1976 [1926]: 179-80).  Consequently, when a request was 
made in 1905 that students be sent to study in Europe or America, the advisory 
council to the Prime Minister “advised against this scheme and suggested that it 
would be better to invite the help of Indian experts” (Landon 1976 [1926]: 180).  Thus 
the ideas associated with the purity of the Hindu state and the need to maintain 
political and social separation, both within the state and between Nepal and the 
‘outside’, were reinforced through the approach the regime took to the provision of 
education. 
 
This dual attitude to the ‘external’, which counters a fear of impurity with an interest 
in mimicking the approach of the British in India is evident in the language policy 
adopted by the Ranas in the early 1900s.  On the one hand the ruling elite maintained 
a strong interest in emulating the English-medium education system.  Yet there was 
also recognition of the importance of language as a means of differentiating Nepal 
from India.  Under the brief reign of Dev Shumsher Rana in 1901, 200 Nepali 
medium primary schools were established across the country.  These were opened to 
all children, a move that was regarded by others as a potential threat to the position of 
the Ranas.  After only four months, Dev Shumsher was ousted from power and many 
of these schools were closed down. However, language as a marker of ‘Nepaliness’ 
was again emphasised in 1934, when Nepali was declared the official language of all 
 6
educational institutions and the medium in which School Leaving Certificate 
examinations were to be conducted.  It is notable that this move was made at a time of 
increased nationalist activity against the British and princely rule in India, and was 
thus a clear attempt to distance the Nepali polity from this and secure the continuation 
of Rana rule. Yet, despite such measures, it proved impossible to isolate Nepal from 
the “ideas and political ferment of modern India” (Mihaly 1965: 16). 
 
Resisting Rana Rule  
Attempts by the Ranas to control social dissent resulted in the strict control of 
teaching of even basic literacy skills, with harsh penalties for those caught engaging 
in unsanctioned teaching and learning activities.  However, covert teaching and 
learning still took place in homes, behind closed doors.  The gradual expansion of 
educational opportunities gathered pace with the inflow of knowledge and expertise 
from those who had travelled out from Nepal, either to escape Rana oppression or to 
seek employment, and the continued transfer of ideas and people across the porous 
Indo-Nepali border (Wood 1965: 22, Dart 1973). 
 
The period during and immediately after World War II was a time of considerable 
unease among the Ranas. The return of servicemen and the consequent spread of ideas 
about alternative ways of life and styles of government posed a threat to the position 
of the ruling elite.   In addition, many ex-soldiers conducted informal literacy classes 
or established schools to pass on the skills acquired during their period of service.  
The elite’s wish to maintain Nepal as an ‘isolated’ and consequently ‘pure’ Hindu 
state became increasingly untenable, as did the position of the Ranas within it (Wood 
1965, Aryal 1977). The growing cross-border transfer of knowledge and political 
ideas, particularly from Nepali Congress party activists in exile in India, became 
gradually more difficult for the regime to control and ultimately contributed to the 
overthrow of the oligarchy in 1950.8 In its place a governing alliance was formed 
between the Nepali Congress and the Ranas, with each group having seven 
representatives in the government. The Shah King, Tribhuvan,  ascended to the throne 
and formed the third element of the coalition.  The end of Rana domination did not, 
however, lead to a corresponding reduction in the political use of schooling to justify 
and secure the positions of particular interest groups. Rather the form and content of 
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educational provision shifted in order to support the position adopted by the new 
government.   
 
Emerging from Darkness: Experiments with Democracy (1951-60) 
The image of Nepal as being closed off or ‘isolated’ from the rest of the world during 
the Rana oligarchy is one which strongly influenced the post-revolution government’s 
attempt to reconstruct the ‘idea of Nepal’.  To legitimate their position, the post-1950 
period was presented by the government as a time of ‘opening up’ to the outside 
world.  Indeed, due to the somewhat uneasy coalition of groups involved in the 
overthrow of the Rana oligarchy, the key basis of unity between the ruling groups was 
their opposition to the previous regime.  Consequently, past isolation was equated 
with stagnation and lack of change (Onta 1997), in contrast to the more dynamic, 
‘developing’ path to be taken in the new period of apparent openness.  Democracy, 
modernity and the interconnection between Nepal and the rest of the world became 
the clarion calls with which the new leadership hoped to gain the support of its newly 
defined ‘citizens’ (De Chene 1996).  Engagement with ideas of modernity and 
scientific and technological advancement were utilised as markers of the changed 
attitude and vision of the new leaders.  For example, the Five Year Plan for Education 
(1956) expressed concern that “the encrustation of the rusts of centuries of ritualism 
have made the conservative minds least receptive and responsive to science” (MOE 
1956: 3).  
 
As well as utilising the rhetoric of development, the Nepali state began to engage 
actively with the new international apparatus of foreign aid.  Specifically, funding was 
accepted from bilateral donors such as India and China, who had strategic, 
geopolitical interests in offering assistance.  Similarly, the United States regarded 
support for poverty reduction measures in Nepal as a key means to contain the spread 
of communism in the context of the Cold War (Mihaly 1965).  The concept of 
development (bikas) and engagement with external sources of financing increasingly 
became the mechanism through which the position of the Nepali state came to be 
understood in relation to the rest of the world. As Pigg notes, “development — rather 
than the residue scars of imperialism — is the overt link between it and the West.  
Bikas is the term through which Nepalis understand their relationship to other parts of 
the world” (Pigg 1992: 497).9 The dominant position of the ruling elite (Indian-
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educated, generally high-caste Hindu men) was maintained and even strengthened 
through the use of this rhetoric, with the idea of development and modernity coming 
to shape intra-national identities and relationships (Shrestha 1995).  Bikas thus 
becomes “the idiom through which the relationship between local communities and 
other places is expressed” (Pigg 1992: 499).  Here a discourse explicitly advocating 
equality and inclusion sets up as its implicit referent a specific vision of what it is to 
be modern or developed.  This discursive move has significant implications for how 
inequality is dealt with in practice. 
 
Expanding Schooling:  A Symbol of Nepal’s Modernity and Development  
The opening up of education opportunities and the development of a ‘national’ 
education system was used to mark the shift in vision the state had of its relationship 
both with its citizens and with the outside world. 10  Promoting schooling became both 
a symbol of the modern, developing nation and a medium through which to transmit 
this revised vision of the state to the populace.  As Caplan has noted, “in practical 
terms, a programme to build schools in every corner of the country could be 
implemented in a relatively short time, which meant that results were highly visible, 
and the resources required, however great, were by and large available locally, so that 
reliance on external assistance was minimal” (Caplan 1970: 8). 
 
In the education policies developed in the 1950s (e.g. NEPC 1955, MOE 1956) a 
strong connection between education, the “emerging from darkness” and the 
“enlightenment” gained by being connected with the outside world is emphasised.  
Education is seen as an essential tool in enabling both the country and the individual 
to deal with the challenges of engagement with the international community: 
 
We have become part of the world, whether we like it or not.  We can no 
longer remain isolated; the world has come to us.  How can we meet this 
world without education?  Must we — who once were the crossroads of 
civilisation — bow our heads in shame to our worldly visitors?  How can 
we evaluate the ‘gifts’ that are offered us — ideologies, new customs, 
inventions and the ways of a new strange world?  How can we protect 
ourselves against slogans and ideologies detrimental to the interests of our 
country?  We can do none of these without education to give us 
understanding and strength to lead us (MOE 1956: 2). 
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An increased connection with the outside world was also related, as highlighted in the 
education policy discourse, to the necessity of having a strong national character to 
the state, with education envisaged as a crucial medium through which this could be 
disseminated.  Indeed, it was felt that “schools and educational systems exist solely 
for the purpose of helping the youth of a nation to become better integrated into their 
society” (NEPC 1955: 14/1). 
 
But in what image was this emerging national identity constructed, and what form of 
education was consequently encouraged?  As noted above, the ‘democratic’ nature of 
the new government clearly staked out the difference between it and the previous 
regime, and was the basis upon which it claimed legitimacy.  Participation in 
schooling was portrayed as a way of supporting the national projects of democracy 
and development and providing the means through which people could “work for the 
good causes of the nation”. Indeed, the ‘national’ character of the new education 
system is continually stressed by the NEPC — reference is made to the plan as the 
‘Nepal National Education Plan’, to ‘National Schools’, and a ‘National Curriculum’ 
(NEPC 1955: 7/2).  As the NEPC stressed, “Education is the sin-qua-non [sic] of 
success of democracy… if ignorance and illiteracy remain for a long time, democracy 
will spell doom and disaster.  Here is one opportunity for the sons of Nepal to come 
forward and fight against darkness and bring light in the country” (NEPC 1955: ii).11 
 
Such a vision of the nation is, however, founded on the unity, that is the similarity, of 
the people living within its boundaries. An implicit, highly specific referent is used as 
the basis on which unity is to be understood, limiting the extent to which ‘difference’ 
can be valued. This is particularly clearly highlighted in relation to the question of the 
appropriate language of instruction.  A policy explicitly advocating the 
marginalisation of ethnic languages spoken within the state was introduced on the 
basis that:  
 
The study of a non-Nepali local tongue would mitigate against the 
effective development of Nepali… If the younger generation is taught to 
use Nepali as the basic language then other languages will gradually 
disappear and greater national strength and unity will result (NEPC 1955: 
8/2). 
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From Class 6 onwards it was regarded as acceptable to begin teaching other 
languages, including Hindi and English, as by this stage “Nepali can be firmly 
established” (NEPC 1955: 8/12).  From 1959, with the adoption of a national primary 
school curriculum, Nepali became the compulsory medium of instruction for classes 
one to five (Onta 1996: 217). 
 
Such practices highlight an implicit valuation of ‘the external’ over ‘the local’ in 
regard to intra-national relations and contact with influences from beyond the national 
borders. The external is seen as more ‘enlightened’ than the local.  The school 
curriculum reinforces this valuation, with a move from an emphasis on “life in school 
and at home” in Class 1 to “life outside Nepal” as a feature of the Class 5 social 
studies curriculum as a means of gradually expanding “the child’s vision from his 
immediate to as broad a world outlook as possible” (NEPC 1955: 8/9). The content of 
schooling reinforced this vision, with a rift emerging between local knowledges 
about, for example, health and cleanliness and the ‘scientific’ advice presented by 
teachers and in texts (e.g. Upreti 1976, Shrestha 1995). Thus the more educated 
children are, the more acquainted they become with places outside their locale.  
Conversely, there is an impression that those who are uneducated remain confined to 
the local.  
 
One cannot discuss the emergence of Nepal’s education system in this period without 
reference to the external (non-Nepali) influence on the development of national 
education policy.  The NEPC, and all major education policy documents prepared 
through the 1950s and 60s, were devised with the financial and technical assistance of 
the United States Overseas Mission (USOM, later renamed USAID).  Many of the 
decisions relating to schooling policy were made in light of the experiences of the 
United States, as a press release, quoting the USAID advisor Hugh B. Wood, from 
March 1954 highlights: 
 
Dr Wood expressed his views on the problem of the medium of 
instruction in primary education.  He said that two hundred years before, 
the very problem had started [sic] them in the face in the United States of 
America, which at that time had a multiplicity of spoken languages: but 
that after the War of Independence, English was given due prominence as 
the medium of instruction and that today there was no problem of 
language there.  Without laying any emphasis on minor local languages, 
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Dr Wood referred to the three fold benefit of giving prominence to one 
language; first, it strengthened national unity; secondly, it economised 
books and teachers; and thirdly, little boys and girls were apt to learn 
other languages quicker than when they were fully grown up.  Therefore, 
he added that if primary education was imparted in a national language 
they would begin to understand it better from their very childhood 
[sic](reproduced in NEPC 1955: 20/A-2). 
 
From these early attempts at building an integrated education system, external 
influence on both the structure and content of schooling provision was considerable, 
with a high level of reliance on foreign funding to finance the promotion of a 
‘national’ programme of education.  
 
Yet, despite these changes in policy and the establishment of new structures for the 
administration of education at the central level, the impact in terms of access to school 
at the local level and the control the state had over individual schools was rather 
limited.  The continued conflict between the Ranas, Nepali Congress and the King 
throughout the 1950s limited the effective implementation of policies and resulted in 
the rather slow construction of a state infrastructure at the local level, particularly in 
more remote areas. The lack of effective administrative structures in place meant that 
the pace of change, the location of schools and the content of instruction were not 
effectively regulated, contrary to the policy emphasis on the extension of a national, 
unified system (Ragsdale 1989, Onta 1996).  Indeed, in 1960 the Education Minister 
was still concerned about the “great intermixture of the various systems in the 
educational structure of the country” and believed that “a democratic national system 
of education is the imperative need of the hour” (quoted in Onta 1996: 217).  The 
inability to curb the expansion of diverse educational institutions led to calls for a 
more interventionist approach to ensure that the state’s vision of national development 
could be pursued.  Such a policy became more practical to implement as political 
differences were quashed and large scale infrastructure development projects were 
undertaken, including the construction of the East-West highway and the expansion of 
telecommunication links in the post-1960 period. 
 
Ek Bhasa, Ek Bhesh, Ek Desh: National education and the Panchayat Era  
Following almost a decade of struggle and tension between the Nepali Congress party 
and the monarchy over the locus of legitimate power in the post Rana period, the King 
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eventually disbanded the party system in a royal coup in December 1960, declaring 
the “experiment with multi-party democracy” a failure. In its place the panchayat 
system of governance was developed.  This would, it was claimed, promote a 
particularly Nepali style of government.  This reconstituting of the state to legitimate 
the increased power of the monarchy entailed a further revisioning of the relationship 
between the population and the system of governance. 
 
Under the Rana regime intra-national differences had been recognised through a 
codified, hierarchical caste structure.  The approach taken to the diversity of the 
Nepali population during the panchayat period was far more integrationist, focusing 
on unity around a common culture (Burghart 1996: 227).  Such an approach to the 
governance of the nation-state was based on tightly organised management and 
control of intra-national ‘difference’, with strict boundaries imposed on how diverse 
interests could be expressed (e.g. Adhikary 1996).  Ethnic differences were given 
little official recognition, with public organisations required to fit within particular 
categories of “class organisations” which were approved by the government.  Political 
parties and ethnic-based groups were explicitly excluded from this.12  
 
Despite the nationalistic rhetoric and the forceful propagation of an ‘official’ Nepali 
nationalism the vision of Nepal presented was still very consciously constructed in 
relation to images of ‘the external’. Further, with the increasing involvement of 
development agencies and external financing of activities, the nation-state had to be 
legible to the international community.  To secure external support, the government 
had to present the state as the provider of key services to the population, such as 
health, water and education, and to demonstrate a justifiable claim to represent the 
interests of its citizens. Engaging with the economic and social reforms that were 
advocated at the global level was thus an important mechanism through which the 
monarchy and panchayat model of government could enhance their popular support 
within the country and boost the external support required to ensure financial backing 
for initiatives.  
 
A focus on development and ‘modernity’ also advanced the position of the political 
elites and their attempts to assimilate different groups within a particular vision of the 
nation-state through the interlinked processes of ‘Nepalisation’ and ‘modernisation’ 
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(Pfaff-Czarnecka 1997: 435-6).  Such a vision of the Nepali nation-state is succinctly 
expressed in the widely promoted slogan ‘ek bhasa, ek bhesh, ek dhesh’ (one 
language, one dress, one nation).  In practice this translated into the forceful 
presentation of a particular vision of the nation, one that served to legitimate the 
position of the political elites both to an internal audience and in the eyes of the 
international community. 
 
The education sector was regarded as a crucial tool in ensuring the promotion of this 
image and was used by the panchayat regime in two distinct ways.  Firstly, schools, 
both as physical spaces and in terms of the curriculum promoted through them, were 
regarded as a medium through which to propagate a particular vision of the Nepali 
nation from Kathmandu to the remotest areas of the country.  School texts highlighted 
the ‘backwardness’ of villages, and ethnic, rural and non-Hindu groups were 
marginalised and placed in an inferior position to the lifestyles and customs of high 
caste, Kathmandu living citizens (Pigg 1992, Pfaff-Czarnecka 1999).  Secondly, the 
focus on education helped legitimate the dominant position of the political elites by 
associating the traits of these groups with ‘development’: one cultural form was 
presented as proffering the opportunity to move beyond a state of ‘underdevelopment’ 
(Pfaff-Czarnecka 1999: 59).  The construction of education as a symbol of progress 
and modernity, coupled with the strong emphasis given to the modern over the non-
modern, cast their position in terms of merit — they were ‘educated’ — in a society 
where, at least de jure, caste and family privilege had ceased to be a justifiable basis 
for maintaining positions of power. 
 
Initially, education policy continued in much the same way as had been envisaged by 
the 1955 NEPC, with education presented as a mechanism which would encourage 
people to unite around the goal of national development and which would enable 
Nepal to play a more significant role in the international community.  The Rana 
regime remained the central focus of attack and the basis against which the regime 
defined itself, with the primary curriculum including time for “discussions on the 
drawbacks of the Rana regime, with special reference to the freedom of speech, 
schools for children, facilities to the people (recreation), blind obedience, etc” (MOE 
1968: 28).13   
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However, a tighter administrative system and political structures that extended down 
to the village level ensured that the state was more able to enforce policy and promote 
changes in public behaviour.14  Thus when, in 1961, it was made compulsory to sing 
the national anthem at the beginning of each school day and to display the King’s 
portrait in all school premises, the infrastructure existed to enforce such decrees.  
Indeed, singing of the national anthem and rastriya git (national songs) gradually 
displaced saying a prayer to Saraswati, which had been how the school day began in 
the 1950s.  As Onta notes, “generating ‘a feeling of national unity and solidarity’ by 
making students recite early in the morning words that evoked grand images of the 
Nepali nation had become more important than praying to Saraswati, the Hindu 
goddess of learning” (Onta 1996: 219). 
 
Yet, by the late 1960s concern had emerged among the ruling elite, fuelled by the 
need to address international donor interests and priorities, that the education on offer 
was not appropriate to the needs of national development, in relation both to the 
promotion of national unity and economic development (e.g. Wood and Knall 1962, 
see also Upraity 1982).  As Ragsdale explains,  “Nepal’s small, elitist system of 
education had been expanded without regard for its suitability to the country’s needs”, 
leading to its functioning as a “psychosocial adornment” rather than offering a system 
which produced citizens able to contribute to the country’s economic development 
(Ragsdale 1989: 15).  Attempts to rectify this, and to bring the system more in line 
with emerging donor interests in technical and vocationally-oriented education, 
created resentment and increased opposition to the panchayat system, notably from 
students who saw opportunities for advancement foreclosed.  For example, in an 
attempt to limit the numbers of arts and commerce graduates and encourage 
involvement in more vocationally-oriented sectors, a failure rate of 80% was 
introduced for university and college courses in these areas, a move which angered 
students and increased the resistance to the regime (Caplan 1970: 10).  In addition, 
students highlighted the lack of employment opportunities available to graduates, 
raising fears about the validity of the linkage between improved education and 
economic development which had informed many of the government’s policies and 
visions of national development.   
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Such dissatisfaction spread wider than just the education sector, with disquiet 
increasingly expressed over the way that the state, which had set itself up as the locus 
of development and modernisation, was unable to match this with actual reform for 
the mass of the population (Pfaff-Czarnecka 1999: 60).  By the late 1960s discontent 
with the panchayat system was growing among the (now underground) political party 
activists, students and more widely, leading the regime to take a more aggressive 
stance in order to promote the merits of panchayat democracy.  Here, again, schooling 
was used as one of the main mechanisms through which the idea of the panchayat as a 
particularly Nepali system of government and route to development could be 
reinforced.  Thus, while educational institutions were a key source of unrest and 
dissent, presenting particular images of the state through schools remained one of the 
primary mechanisms through which the panchayat regime hoped to reassert its 
authority.   
 
The National Education System Plan 
The National Education System Plan (NESP) of 1971, perhaps the most politically 
significant education policy document to emerge in the post-Rana period, was the 
central focus of this attempt to re-legitimate the panchayat regime.  It represented a 
more aggressive attempt to mould the Nepali nation into a particular image, one 
which served the interests of the panchayat rulers.  The NESP took the position that 
education should be based on the promotion of national unity and the assimilation of 
individuals into the mould of the Nepali nation-state, a state that had at its heart the 
panchayat model of government.  As the goals of the NESP state, education was:  
 
to strengthen devotion to crown, country, national unity and the panchayat 
system, to develop uniform traditions in education by bringing together 
various patterns under a single national policy, to limit the tradition of 
regional languages, to encourage financial and social mobility, and to 
fulfil manpower requirements essential for national development (MOE 
1971: 1). 
 
The significance of this shift is perhaps most clearly highlighted by comparing the 
position it takes with that of the earlier Plans. The NEPC stressed that “the context of 
the curriculum must be adapted to the culture and needs of the people” (NEPC 1955: 
8/6), whereas the NESP actively attempted to change the way individuals and groups 
viewed their ‘culture’ and their relationship with the state through the education 
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system (Onta 1996:221). As Mohammad Mohsin, one of the main architects of the 
Plan, emphasised: 
 
Its over-all objective … is to overhaul the inherited system of education 
and transform it into a potent and effective mechanism to synthesise 
diverse socio-economic interests, negotiate ethno-lingual heterogeneity 
and convert the geopolitical entity of Nepal into an emotionally integrated 
nationhood (Mohsin 1972: 35-6). 
 
In part this move marked a growing confidence in the government’s own capabilities, 
which resulted from the return of Nepali education experts trained overseas.  But it 
could also be read as an expression of concern over the impact that policies so tied up 
with international agendas were having on the ability of the ruling group to maintain 
their legitimacy and control over the various institutions of the state.  Indeed, the 
NESP can be seen as “Nepal’s declaration of independence from U.S. policy 
dominance” (Sellar 1981: 11).  Since the 1950s there had been a significant reliance 
on US financial and technical assistance in education sector reforms; they were the 
only major donor to the sector in this first 20 years of foreign aid support.   
 
Consequently, shifts in the donor country’s aid policy and educational priorities had a 
significant impact on the form that education reform took in Nepal (Reed and Reed 
1968, Sellar 1981).15 The NESP thus represents, at least in part, an attempt to 
challenge and break away from this pattern of influence, with some key features of 
the American-influenced system being overturned.  For example, school management 
committees, which had been introduced in line with the U.S. experience of such 
systems, were abolished under the new Plan (Reed and Reed 1968: 131-2, Master 
Plan Team 1997: 124).  Schools were thus presented as government, as opposed to 
community, institutions drawing the school and the village firmly into the national 
project of development and allowing increased central control over teacher 
appointment and transfer.16 
 
The power of the NESP rhetoric lay in its promotion of the view that national unity 
based on sameness would provide a level playing field, that it would help promote 
social mobility and open up greater opportunities for the development of individuals 
as well as the state.  However, the basis of this unity and the sameness to which all 
were to conform were modelled on, and thus privileged, specific segments of the 
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society.  The “triumvirate of official Nepali nationalism” (Onta 1996:38)  — the 
monarchy, Hinduism and the Nepali language — provided the basis for this national 
culture with the first two collapsed into a powerful motif of the national culture 
“palatable to the dominant communities of Bahun and Chettris, as well as to the elites 
among the Newars and other communities” (Shah 1993: 9 cited in Onta 1996: 38). 
 
In terms of the curriculum promoted under the NESP, language was again stressed as 
a crucial factor in promoting the vision of a united Nepal, with 40% of teaching in the 
primary school devoted to Nepali language instruction.  Again this represents a key 
dimension of national identity and unity, as conceived by the regime. The emphasis 
on Nepali both differentiated the country from India and highlighted a marker of 
internal unity and ‘sameness’.  In addition, while languages such as English, French, 
Russian, German, Japanese, Portuguese and Spanish could be taught as optional 
subjects in high school, only three of the ‘local’ languages of Nepal were included 
(Maithali, Newari and Bhojpuri), further emphasising the interest in downplaying the 
value of mother-tongue instruction and diversity while expressing the wish for Nepal 
to be a player on the world stage.  
 
Further, as Onta (1996, 1997) highlights, a particular vision of the bir (brave) Nepali 
nation was created in school textbooks during the panchayat period.  Indeed, this 
template of rastriya itihas (national history) was “at the centre of the state-sponsored 
effort to make students into citizens socialised and loyal” to a specific vision of the 
nation (Onta 1996: 215).  As such, it emerged as an important strand of official Nepali 
national culture under the panchayat system.  The picture presented, while claiming to 
be ‘national’ offers a very particular interpretation that serves to reinforce and 
legitimate the dominant position of the elite Hindu caste groups and the Shah 
monarchy.  The valuation of high caste Hindu lifestyles and the culture of the urban 
elite over that of other groups within Nepal was intertwined with and further 
reinforced by modernisation discourses.   Engagement in the project of development 
was defined as the major marker of social difference, while emphasis continued to be 
given to the national, and ostensibly inclusive, nature of this project. 
 
The NESP approach was also designed to bring the schooling system firmly into line 
with the economic development and labour force requirements of the country.  As 
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well as including vocational subjects such as poultry farming, metalwork, auto-
mechanics and plumbing in the secondary school curriculum (MOE 1971: 27), 
dedicated technical schools were also established in a number of areas.17  Here, 
however, a key problem with the NESP initiative becomes apparent: despite the well-
laid plans to increase the vocational element of instruction, without equipment or 
trained teachers it was impossible to implement the Plan successfully.  Teachers at 
one school in my research site explained how students at the school had been awarded 
points for typing courses, when they had never even seen a typewriter.  In another I 
heard that kitchen equipment was kept locked and unused, despite it having been 
brought in explicitly so that the school could provide training in catering. 
 
There are clear tensions evident in the discourse and practice of the NESP, with the 
defining of national unity, modernity and the recognition of diversity open to 
interpretation and political manipulation.  For example, the idea of ‘the modern’ as 
that which emanated from the centre (i.e. from Kathmandu) was reinforced by the 
NESP policy of bringing teachers from ‘outside’ to village schools as part of the 
National Development Service (NDS) that university students had to complete.  
Introduced in part to expand the development-oriented dimension of schooling and in 
part to extend central control over rural areas, the NDS required all university students 
to spend a 10 month period engaged in rural development work in order to be 
awarded their degree (Yadav 1982:42).  
 
While the NDS made some contribution to breaking the long-standing urban bias of 
the education system, the programme was the focus of resistance from many students, 
particularly those who were from Kathmandu and had to travel out of the Kathmandu 
Valley for their NDS placement.  As Acharya notes, “as the motivation of parents and 
of students for higher education is largely conditioned by its link with non-farm urban 
employment opportunities, the program was not readily welcomed in its initial 
phases” (1982: 56).  The student strike of 1975, which expanded to include a series of 
political demands and marked the start of a concerted campaign against the panchayat 
system, was initiated around demands associated with their dissatisfaction with the 
NDS programme.  With this growing unrest, the possibility that the presence of 
students in rural areas would lead to the rapid spread of dissent concerned the 
government and the programme was quietly abandoned.   
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Student unrest played a significant catalytic role in the move towards reinstating a 
multi-party system, with the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist) attempting 
to organise this discontent into a movement against the panchayat system in 1980 
(Mikesell 1999: 100).  While the movement was not in itself successful, a referendum 
was held to gauge popular support for the panchayat system, a vote which, amidst a 
high level of intimidation and ballot rigging (Mikesell 1999), was narrowly won by 
the ruling regime.  From the late 1970s through to the Jana Andolan (People’s 
Movement) of 1990, there were strikes and protests as the political parties became 
increasingly visible, with schools and colleges significant sites of protest and unrest.  
The teachers’ strike of 1984-85, for instance, began as a pay dispute yet was quickly 
taken up by the two major outlawed political parties, the Nepali Congress and the 
various Communist Party factions, as a way to further their popular base (Burghart 
1996).  A student protest in 1985, called as the result of the police firing on students 
in the classrooms of Kathmandu’s Durbar School, further contributed to the growing 
unrest across the country, which culminated in several bomb explosions in 
Kathmandu and a number of provincial centres in June 1985 (Mikesell 1999, Burghart 
1996).  The shock at this violence led to a temporary abatement of opposition from 
teachers and political parties alike, only to be fuelled again by the popular discontent 
with increased food and fuel prices which resulted from the Indian trade embargo 
imposed in March 1989 and the growing confidence and frustration of the political 
parties (Hoftun 1994, Hoftun et al 1999).  This time the movement was more 
coordinated and coincided with a growing sense of defeatism and internal division 
within the old regime, and thus ultimately led to the ‘revolution’, or rather the 
restoration of multi-party democracy, in 1990.   
 
With such unrest and the failure of the iconic NESP, education policy in the 1980s 
became increasingly tied to the agendas of international donors as the government 
sought financial support and both internal and international legitimacy.  During this 
period a shift in the support given by donors to Nepal can be traced, with the United 
Nations’ agencies and the World Bank becoming increasingly significant players in 
the education sector. Two projects of particular note were introduced during this 
period, the Education for Rural Development Project (‘the Seti Project’), developed 
and funded by UNICEF, UNESCO and UNDP (Bennett 1979), and the Primary 
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Education Project (PEP), supported by UNICEF and the World Bank.  Both were 
spatially bounded initiatives, confined to a limited number of districts: the former to 
six districts in the Far Western region of the country, and PEP in a further twenty 
districts scattered throughout Nepal.  Such initiatives highlight the explicit 
intertwining of approaches to education reform in Nepal with global programmes and 
the interests of the international donor community, in these cases the need to utilise 
integrated approaches to rural development and the growing focus on the promotion 
of ‘education for all’, with a particular emphasis placed on primary schooling.  Such a 
focus encouraged a move away from a centrist approach to school administration with 
the introduction of a school ‘cluster’ model and the use of ‘resource centres’ as 
mechanisms to encourage more decentralised control and management of educational 
institutions (e.g. Tamang & K.C.: 1995:i).18 Clearly such moves represent a clash of 
interests for the government which wished both to gain international support, by 
engaging with the rhetoric of decentralisation, and to maintain the privileges and 
power of the ruling group.19  However, this process of seeking internal and 
international legitimacy for the state through engagement with global development 
discourse and international initiatives continued apace as the state was subject to a 
further re-visioning as a result of the  ‘Movement for the Restoration of Democracy’ 
in 1990. 
 
Unity Amidst Diversity: Multi-party Democracy and Schooling 
With the fall of the panchayat regime and the re-emergence of a multi-party 
democratic structure in 1990, the Nepali nation was again re-imagined and redefined.  
The Constitution was re-written to define Nepal as a “multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, 
democratic, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom” 
(Hutt 1993).  This shift in construction of the nation represents a further attempt by a 
new political regime to distance itself from its predecessor, in this case by 
emphasising the acceptance of a greater degree of intra-national ‘difference’ — both 
political and social — than was permitted during the panchayat period.  In addition, 
with ‘development’ remaining a key feature of this construction, government policy 
continued to be influenced by external relations and, specifically, the requirements 
and expectations of development assistance organisations.  
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The return to multi-party democracy was couched in terms of increasing participation 
and strengthening of civil society.  This fitted neatly with the expressed interests of 
leading donor agencies in promoting greater partnership between actors in the 
development process and for a more participatory approach to the construction and 
implementation of programmes. Indeed, as De Chene has highlighted, what has 
emerged in the 1990s is not “adjective-less democracy”, but “bikase” democracy; 
democracy based on engagement with development processes of the international 
donor community (De Chene 1996).  Yet, multiple layers of conflict remain, with the 
government seeking to mediate competing visions of the role of the state whilst 
striving to maintain the authoritative position of the ruling elite.  
 
Such interests are particularly evident in negotiations that took place as the 
Constitution was prepared and attempts made to appease the interests of various 
groups. 20   Ethnic and linguistic rights organisations, for example, found their claims 
for the greater recognition of diversity were widely dismissed or only partially dealt 
with by those preparing the final documentation. Their demands were interpreted by 
the Constitution Recommendations Commission as a source of communal tension and 
a potential threat to national unity.  Rather than address the concerns expressed by 
these groups and acknowledge their claims for greater inclusion, the activists’ claims 
were dismissed as irrelevant (Hutt 1993: 35-6). What recognition of diversity there 
was in the Constitution was carefully balanced against provisions which secured the 
position of existing dominant groups.  In the case of language, for instance, while 
languages spoken as a mother tongue within the state were given the status of 
‘national languages’(rastriya bhasa), Nepali in the Devanagari script retained a 
privileged position as the ‘language of the nation’ (rastra bhasa) and the official 
language of government.  
 
An examination of the impact of global discourses on educational reform in the post-
1990 period highlights this intertwining of local, national and global visions of the 
state and the inclusion of diverse groups, and highlights the tensions that exist as a 
result.  The World Conference on Education for All in 1990 and the Declaration 
which stemmed from it (WCEFA 1990) reiterated the belief that a ‘global consensus’ 
on education for development policies had emerged.  This position included a call for 
a greater focus on basic and primary levels of education and the reaffirmation of the 
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commitment to universal primary education. The new government in Nepal signed up 
to the WCEFA Declaration as one of its first international agreements, signalling 
interests in establishing strong links with the international community and in 
attracting financial support for development efforts. In 1992, the multi-donor financed 
Basic and Primary Education Project (BPEP) was instigated as a national response to 
this global initiative. 
 
The relationship between education and the dominant global vision of development 
became more strongly articulated throughout the 1990s, with greater certainty over, 
for example, the links between level of education and fertility levels, farming 
productivity and child mortality.  This discourse filtered through to the national level, 
with the promotion of education in Nepal linked even more strongly to ideas of 
development.  Here, however, a relationship with ‘development’ and external ideas 
and institutions is articulated not simply in terms of modernisation discourses, but in 
relation to discourses of participation, partnership and poverty alleviation. Further, 
with this increasing globalisation of education initiatives came a need for a high 
degree of comparability between the outcomes of BPEP and the indicators used for 
the assessment of Education For All at the regional and global level.  Thus an 
increased focus on quantifiable indicators of achievement emerged, with studies 
commissioned which aimed to highlight changes in areas of key interest to the global 
donor community (e.g. EDSC 1999, 1997, CERID 1997).   
 
Consequently the types of ‘diversity’ focused on and made explicit for this forum 
were somewhat different from previous policies, with gender, disability, ‘socially 
disadvantaged’ groups and, particularly, poverty becoming salient indicators of 
difference at the policy and programme level.  The 1992 Report of the National 
Education Commission, for example, highlighted that, “After the reinstatement of 
democracy in the country, it has been realised on all hands that education has a key 
role to play in bringing about social changes, and in the reconstruction of the nation as 
a whole” (NEC 1992: 1).  It was therefore important to provide education to women, 
children, orphans, the disabled and the poor “to enable them to become partners of 
national development” (ibid.: 6).  Such rhetoric speaks to two distinct audiences, the 
international aid community and an internal audience who anticipated significant 
social and political change in light of the constitutional reforms. 
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The images which adorn the covers of the social studies textbooks portray the sense of 
unity around development interests which is emphasised in education policy. The 
Class 5 textbook Mero Desh, for example, depicts school children engaged in a range 
of development efforts, including planting trees, helping disabled people to cross the 
road, and cleaning a temple courtyard.   More direct articulation of donor agency 
interests can be found in the content of the school curriculum. For example,  
UNICEF’s mark can be seen in the Social Science curriculum. Mero Desh Book 4, for 
example, includes a lesson on children’s rights which draws attention to the plight of 
the kathi(street children) of Kathmandu and the difficulties faced by child workers.  
The Health, Population and Environment component of the grade 9 and 10 curriculum 
has received extensive support from IUCN (The World Conservation Union) and 
UNFPA, with curriculum development and textbook publication assisted by these 
organisations.  The content of this course thus links very strongly with the 
development goals prioritised by these institutions, namely the need to curb rapid 
population expansion in the interests of alleviating poverty and protecting the 
environment. 
 
Despite the emphasis on ‘unity amidst diversity’ as the defining characteristic of the 
nation, a lack of clarity remains about how diversity is actually to be dealt with and in 
what image ‘unity’ is to be constructed.  As the NEC Report notes, the new 
Constitution “affirms that the State will follow a policy of maintaining national unity 
in the midst of the cultural diversity of the country by allowing everybody to develop 
his [sic.] language, literature, script, art and culture in healthy, happy harmony with 
all other religions, ethnic groups, communities and languages” (NEC 1992: 6).  
Tension remains, however, over whether this vision can go beyond representing 
diversity as the colourful cultural differences of the many ethnic groups, their food, 
clothes and lifestyles, and begin to tackle the underlying inequalities of access to 
resources and the differential status of various social groups within the nation.   
 
The greater recognition of diversity proffered under the multi-party system also 
produced greater space for challenges to be made to the existing construction of 
‘Nepaliness’.  Again, education policy and practice emerged as key arenas within 
which alternative visions were advanced.  Consequently, a complex network of 
interests and competing visions of the Nepali nation-state can be seen interacting in 
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and around the site of the school (Caddell 2002). Political parties and ethnic activist 
groups, for example, have sought to harness the power of the school to advance their 
particular visions of the Nepali nation and social change. This power stems partly 
from the presence of large groups of educated young people in a context where they 
are able to communicate and mobilise — a situation which continues to make schools 
and colleges desirable recruiting grounds for support.  Indeed, teacher and student 
unions affiliated to the main political parties are active in many government schools, 
recruiting members and disseminating party messages.   
 
But the significance of the school goes beyond this.  Its political value is integrally 
linked to the widespread perception of the school as an institution connected to places 
and ideas considered to be ‘developed’ (Pigg 1992).  The school acts as an arena in 
which alternative models of development and the state can be presented.  Groups, 
such as the Maoists and ethnic activist organisations, compete to win the support and 
confidence of the populace through school-based activities (Caddell 2002: 203ff).  For 
example, the Maoists have demanded an end to the practice of collecting fees from 
government school pupils, the cessation of compulsory Sanskrit instruction and have 
forced schools to end the practice of singing the national anthem during assemblies.  
Such moves appear to be aimed both at gaining popular support for the movement at 
highlighting the alternative vision of Nepal the Maoists wish to see develop – a 
republican state.   
 
The challenges offered do not, however, completely reject the dominant model of the 
state.  Both the Maoists and the ethnic activist groups retain a focus on improving and 
expanding ‘development’ opportunities.  It is the nature of that ‘development’ and the 
intra and inter-state relations in which it is to be achieved that are contested.  The 
Maoists, for example, claim to offer opportunities for previously marginalised groups 
to directly engage in development efforts.  In this context, however, the process of 
development and participation is somewhat different from the dominant model 
promoted through government policy, involving a reshaping of the political and social 
landscape. Ethnic activist organisations seek to place their perceived constituents at 
the centre of development efforts whilst challenging inequalities in existing state 
policy and practice.  Many ethnic organisations offer scholarship programmes to 
allow children from their respective groups to attend school.  Others aim to promote 
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mother-tongue instruction through the development of textbooks and teacher training 
in ethnic languages.  In this case development and diversity are again central features 
of the vision of Nepal, although the specific configuration of the relationship poses a 
challenge to existing practice.   The school, as a key site of ‘development’ in the 
popular imagination, is thus an important arena in which these alternatives can be 
promoted and legitimated.  
 
Conclusion 
Through this paper the relationship between schooling, development and the Nepali 
state has been explored from a historical perspective, highlighting the complex 
intertwining of these concepts and the contested and political use to which they have 
been put by various groups. Significantly, there remains a degree of common ground 
between the positions.  Both those who promote and those who seek to challenge the 
dominant frameworks of schooling in Nepal engage in discussions that revolve 
around the same central ideas, particularly the importance of schooling as a site for 
the promotion of individual, community and national development.  Yet, despite the 
common language, distinctly different dialects are discernible, which significantly 
shift the way in which the rhetoric is utilised.  
 
In the post-1950 period, we see the formulation of ideas of the ‘nation’ and of 
‘development’ which, while presented as neutral, converge with the cultural and 
social traits associated with the ruling groups. Purportedly ‘national education’ is in 
practice education which promotes a particular vision of the nation — and benefits 
specific groups within it.  Due to the considerable donor involvement in the education 
sector since the early 1950s, the construction of a national education system is also 
strongly influenced by external visions and representations of ‘Nepal’ and the wider 
development aid agenda of agencies involved in the reform process.  Burghart’s 
assertion that the panchayat government legitimated itself “on native terms, but 
through foreign eyes” (1996: 260) is therefore more widely illuminating in terms of 
education policy development.  Education as a ‘national’ project is articulated by 
successive governments in terms that resonate with internal political interests.  In 
addition, the requirement of foreign funding and support ensures that ideas and forms 
of organisation are presented in terms that are legible within an international context.  
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In the post-1990 era this remains the case, although with greater opportunity for those 
‘native terms’ to be challenged and alternative visions proffered.   
 
Understanding the historical context of educational, political and social change 
highlights the embedded nature of tensions between visions of national unity, 
modernity and ‘development’.  Such a trajectory has important implications for how 
the contemporary context of education reform is conceived and engaged with.  Calls 
to keep politics out of educational planning (e.g. MPT 1997:5) and policy documents 
that highlight the development ‘goods’ that schooling offers overlook the complex 
position of the institution in contemporary Nepal.  Rather, there is a need to take a 
more situated view of the intertwining of visions of development and tradition, 
national unity and external influence.  Educational reform and the social space of the 
school remain key arenas in which struggles over the nature of these relationships are 
played out.  Understanding the multiple visions of the Nepali state and development 
promoted and challenged through schools must, therefore, remain a key concern of 
those seeking to comprehend or influence social and educational change in the 
contemporary context.   
 
 
 
Endnotes: 
                                                          
1 The PhD research from which this paper draws was funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council.  Further support for publication and dissemination of findings was provided by an ESRC Post 
Doctoral Fellowship.  
2 The current primary school texts were produced with the assistance of UNICEF and, at the secondary 
level, particular courses have been introduced and supported by development agencies.  The Population 
and Environment component of the Grade 9 and 10 curriculum received support from IUCN (The 
World Conservation Union) and UNFPA.  
3 Instigated by Jung Bahadur Rana in a temporary alliance with the Queen, the Kot Massacre of 15th 
September 1846 saw the routing of the leading noblemen and the fleeing of the King to Banaras.  
Attempts were made by the King in 1847 to regain his position, but he was taken prisoner and the heirs 
to the throne were kept under strict surveillance (see Wright 1958 [1877], Mihaly 1965: 14 for a 
detailed account of these events). 
4 Liechty suggests that “Nepal’s management of foreignness through a practice of selective exclusion 
shifted from being a strategy of foreign policy (to protect the state from foreign intervention) to a 
desperate domestic policy (to protect the Rana regime from its own people)” (Liechty 1997: 8). 
5 This legal codification of intra-state relations and the strict taxation policies of the Ranas were 
somewhat variably enforced (Pfaff-Czarnecka 1999: 51, Mihaly 1965: 14). 
6 Indeed, in 1877, the British Resident Surgeon in Kathmandu remarked that the subject of schools 
could be dismissed as “briefly as that of snakes in Ireland.  There are none” (Wright 1958 [1877]: 18). 
7 During his trip to Europe in 1850, the first Rana Prime Minister, Jung Bahadur Rana, appeared 
particularly impressed with the English system of education (Aryal 1977). 
8 An abortive coup attempt in 1940 led by Indian-educated Nepalis was the first of a series of high 
profile attempts to topple the existing system.  This led ultimately to a concerted military attack on the 
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ruling oligarchy from Indian soil in 1950, notably with the assistance of disaffected lower ranking 
members of the Rana family. 
9 This vision of Nepal as only opening to the outside world in 1950 was also utilised by the 
development agencies as a basis for justifying intervention, with Nepal seen as a “development 
laboratory”, a “blank slate” and a “textbook opportunity” to try out new approaches to social reform 
and aid provision (Fujikura 1996). 
10 The increase in the number of schools in Nepal since 1950 is striking, rising from 321 in 1950 to 
10,130 in 1980 and 23,702 in 1994 (NPC 1996, MOE 1997). 
11 The ‘daughters’ of Nepal were not to be excluded from this process. Girls were considered to be 
“homemakers and citizens” and needed education as much as boys in order to fulfil these roles (NEPC 
1955: 8/2). 
12 Five class organisations were recognised — farmers, women, workers, youth, and ex-servicemen — 
and all organisations had to fit into one of these categories if they were to be deemed legitimate groups 
under the panchayat system (Borgstrom 1980). 
13 The All Round National Education Committee, established in 1961, did introduce slight revisions to 
the previous school curriculum, including the inclusion of the biographies of national heroes, patriots 
and martyrs and lessons on rajbhakti (service to the monarchy) (Onta 1996: 218). 
14 The regime, however, was not interested in challenging private behaviour, only that which directly 
and publicly threatened to disrupt the order of the regime (see Burghart 1996 pp. 300-318). 
15 From 1954-1975 USAID provided nearly US$19 million to education projects in Nepal, including 
support to the Educational Materials Organisation, a focus on promoting universal primary education 
between 1954-67, and attempts to promote vocational education.  The university sector received 
support from India (Upraity 1982: 5).  
16 A further rejection of the U.S. model was the reduction of primary schooling from five to three years. 
17 Pre-vocational training was introduced in lower secondary (Class 4-7), with primary classes 
including sections on hygiene and handicraft production (MOE 1971: 24-25). 
18 A number of schools (approximately 15-20) are grouped together for training and supervision 
purposes.  A ‘resource person’ is responsible for each cluster and events are held in the designated 
‘resource centre’. 
19 See, for example, Dixit’s discussion of the Seti Project (2002: 209). 
20 There was also a significant external focus to the constitutional amendments. The Commission sent a 
representative to Britain on a study tour, to examine constitutional issues, including relations between 
the elected government and the monarchy (Hutt 1993: 35). 
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